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OMNISCIENCE, TENSED FACTS,
AND DIVINE ETERNITY
William Lane Craig

A difficulty for a view of divine eternity as timelessness is that if time is
tensed, then God, in virtue of His omniscience, must know tensed facts. But
tensed facts, such as It is now t, can only be known by a temporally located
being.
Defenders of divine atemporality may attempt to escape the force of this
argument by contending either that a timeless being can know tensed facts or
else that ignorance of tensed facts is compatible with divine omniscience.
Kvanvig, Wierenga, and Leftow adopt both of these strategies in their various
defenses of divine timelessness. Their respective solutions are analyzed in
detail and shown to be untenable.
Thus, if the theist holds to a tensed view of time, he should construe divine
eternity in terms of omnitemporality.

Introduction
Many theists in the Western tradition have held that God is timeless, and
recently this doctrine has enjoyed something of a resurgence. 1 The objective reality of tense remains, however, problematic for the doctrine of
divine atemporality. For if an A-Theory of time (in McTaggart's terminology) is correct, there exist tensed facts, of which God, as an omniscient
being, cannot be ignorant. But since tensed facts can only be known by a
temporal being, God must therefore be temporal.
The objection, then, is that
1. God is timeless.

2. God is omniscient.
and
3. A temporal world exists.
are broadly logically inconsistent, as is evident from the necessary truth of
4. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows
tensed facts.
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5. If God is timeless, He does not know tensed facts.
Since (2) is essential to theism and (3) is evidently true, (1) must be false.
The B-theorist escapes this argument by denying that there are any
tensed facts, so that (4) is false. The B-theorist holds that God knows all the
facts there are about the temporal world in knowing tenseless facts. Thus,
if one embraces a tenseless theory of time, he eludes the objector's snare.
Most defenders of divine timelessness, however, are eager to free their
doctrine from dependency on the B-Theory. The question, then, is how
one may affirm the reality of tensed facts and yet maintain either that God
knows them or that His ignorance of them does not impugn His omniscience.

Timeless Knowledge of Tensed Facts
Some atemporalists have attempted to argue that God does know tensed
facts, thus denying the truth of (5). For example, Jonathan Kvanvig holds
both to the objective reality of tensed facts and to God's timeless knowledge of all facts, which together imply that God has timeless knowledge of
tensed facts. Kvanvig's defense of this position relies upon his analysis of
propositions expressed by sentences containing personal indexicals. 2 In
lieu of positing privately accessible propositions, he analyzes belief in
terms of a triadic relation between an intentional attitude, a proposition,
and a particular manner of accessing, or grasping, the proposition.
Personal indexicals express individual essences, which are part of the
propositional content of the sentence containing such indexical words. But
this propositional content is differently accessed by different persons.
When Kvanvig says, "I'm Kvanvig," he expresses the same proposition as I
do when I say to him, "You're Kvanvig," but this propositional content is
directly grasped by Kvanvig and indirectly grasped by me. Kvanvig suggests that the proposition is grasped through the meanings of the sentences
involved; since these are different/ the propositional content is differently
accessed by Kvanvig and me. Thus, an omniscient God has the same
knowledge of the facts as we do with respect to the propositions we
express through sentences containing personal indexicals, but we directly
access those propositions involving our respective individual essences,
while God accesses this same propositional content indirectly.
Kvanvig proposes an analogous solution for dealing with tensed facts
expressed by sentences like "It is now 1 June 1984." He asserts that the
demonstrative "now" expresses the individual essence of the time to which
it refers. He maintains that "temporal demonstratives are just particular
ways of referring to the essences of moments."4 Such an interpretation of
temporal indexicals permits us to hold that God grasps the same propositional content that we do when we use sentences like "It is now 1 June
1984." On Kvanvig's view the same proposition is expressed by the sentence "Today is 1 June 1984" uttered on that date as is expressed by the
sentence "Yesterday was 1 June 1984" uttered on June 2. The difference in
behavior resulting from these two beliefs is due to the meanings of the sentences through which the identical propositional content is accessed. A
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person grasps a proposition containing the essence of a time directly only if
that person grasps the proposition at that time, which issues in a presenttense belief; otherwise the proposition is grasped indirectly, which in the
case of temporal persons will yield beliefs involving other tenses. Hence,
one can affirm the doctrines of timelessness, immutability and omniscience by affirming that God indirectly grasps every temporal moment,
and directly grasps none of them."s
At face value, Kvanvig's analysis would not seem to be a defense of
God's timeless knowledge of tensed facts, but the claim that tense in some
way derives from the manner of accessing propositional content, which
itself is tenseless. For the essences of the times picked out by temporal
indexicals do not include their tensed properties (for example, presentness), or it becomes inexplicable how indexical expressions like "today"
and "yesterday" could refer to the same individual essence and how God
could timelessly grasp propositional content involving such essences. But
Kvanvig denies that there is any temporal element expressed by tensed
sentences which is not part of their propositional content. Referring to
what he calls the "proposition"
/I

1. It is now 1 June 1984.

and
1A. The essence of the moment picked out by the use of the demonstrative 'now' in (1) is mutually exemplified with the property of
being 1 June 1984.
Kvanvig asserts,
... the apparent infection of propositions such as (1) by temporality is
eliminated by noting that (lA) lacks this temporality and further contains all the same temporal elements as (1). If (lA) is not identical to
(I), it is not because of some temporal dimension; it must be for some
other reason. 6
It is odd that Kvanvig refers to his (1) as a proposition, for on his own view

propositions lack indexicality. Rather (1) is a sentence, and the question is
whether the proposition expressed by (1) is infected by temporality, that is
to say, whether that proposition is such that it cannot be expressed "without implying temporal indexicals."7 Kvanvig's claim is that the propositional content of (1) can be expressed by sentences not implying temporal
indexicals. His reason for this claim is that (lA) is not so infected (either it
expresses the same proposition as (1) without the use of temporal indexicals or else it represents the propositional content of (1) and can be
expressed other than by (1) through a sentence not implying temporal
indexicals) and, moreover, contains all the same temporal elements as (1). But
(lA) is true only if the "is" in (lA) is tenseless. Otherwise (lA) is false, having been true only on 1 June 1984. If (lA) is tensed, the time of its truth is
just the same as that of (1). Thus Kvanvig errs when he says that if (lA) is
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not identical to (1) it is not because of some temporal element--on the contrary, it is precisely because of the absence of tense from (lA) that it is not
identical to (1). If all the temporal elements of (1) are contained in (lA) and
God's knowledge is of propositions expressible by sentences like (lA), then
God knows no tensed facts nor, indeed, is tense any objective temporal element at all, either of the propositional content of (1) or of the way of accessing that propositional content. Tense is merely a feature of language and
nothing more. Kvanvig's analysis thus miscarries: it implies that the
propositional content of tensed sentences is tenseless and that such sentences imply no temporal element not described by their propositional content, which in tum implies the non-objectivity of tense. 8
A somewhat similar, but crucially adjusted, account of divine omniscience is offered by Edward Wierenga, who considers tense to belong to
the propositional content expressed by tensed sentences, so that God must,
in virtue of His omniscience, know tensed facts. 9 In order to explain why
such knowledge does not involve God in temporality, Wierenga appeals,
like Kvanvig, to the analogy of propositions expressed by sentences containing first-person pronouns. lO Adopting Plantinga's notion of an individual essence-a property which something can possess essentially and no
other thing can possess at all-, Wierenga asserts that we should hold one
of a person's essences to be special, namely, the one expressed by that person's use of the word "1." In my case this essence is the property of being
me. Wierenga calls this special essence one's haecceity, and he claims that
propositions expressed by sentences involving the first person pronoun
entail the haecceity of the person using such expressions; such propositions
he calls "first person propositions." Now Wierenga does not think that I am
the only person who can grasp a proposition entailing my haecceity. Rather
what is crucial is that I cannot believe such a proposition without having a
de se belief, that is, a belief about me myself. A person 5 believes de se that
he himself is F just in case there is a haecceity E such that 5 has E and 5
believes a proposition having E as a constituent and which attributes being F
to whomever has E. Being omniscient, God also believes those propositions
which have my haecceity as a constituent, but since the haecceity is mine,
not God's, His believing them does not issue in de se beliefs for Him, as my
believing them does for me.
On the analogy of personal haecceities, Wierenga asserts that moments of
time also have special essences or haecceities. A proposition containing the
haecceity of a time he calls a "present-time proposition." We temporal
beings can only grasp present-time propositions at the time whose haecceity
is contained in the proposition, not before or after. When a person believes a
present-time proposition at its time, that person has a de praesenti belief. A
person 5 believes de praesenti at a time t that it is then the case that p just in
case there is a haecceity T such that t has T and at t 5 believes a proposition
having T as a constituent and which attributes being such that p to whatever
time has T. Wierenga analyzes the proposition expressed by A. N. Prior's
liThe 1960 exams are over" as a proposition entailing the conjunction of the
haecceity of the time of Prior's belief and the property of being such that the

1960 exams have finished bifore then.
Now Wierenga contends that there is no reason why God cannot believe

229

OMNISCIENCE, TENSED FACTS, DIVINE ETERNITY

all true present-time propositions, just as He believes all true first-person
propositions. Just as His belief in a first-person proposition does not give
Him a belief de se unless it is a belief in His own first-person proposition, so
a belief in a present-time proposition does not give Him belief de praesenti
unless He believes that proposition at its time. Being timeless, God did not
have to wait, as did Prior, until August 29, 1960, in order to grasp the
proposition Prior expressed by saying, "The 1960 exams are over." He
grasps and believes the relevant proposition timelessly and so forms no de
praesenti belief in so doing. Thus, a timeless God knows all present-time
propositions, and so there are no tensed facts unknown to Him.
It seems to me that Wierenga's account of God's knowledge of propositions expressed by tensed discourse is multiply defective. To begin with,
his account of what it is to have a de praesenti belief is implausible. Suppose
I glance out the window and form the judgment, "It's raining. On
Wierenga's account, what I actually believe is a proposition about a certain
time which attributes to that time a peculiar property, being such that it is
raining then. But surely I do not believe anything of the sortY I may be
utterly unconscious of the present time and certainly am not forming beliefs
about its properties or its haecceity. Whatever plausibility attends
Wierenga's analysis of de se beliefs derives from the fact that expression of
such beliefs in English involves the use of first-person indexicals, so that S
can be conceived to believe a proposition involving S's haecceity and a
property F. But the temporal analogue to such beliefs de se are beliefs
involving present-tense indexicals like "now." When we have beliefs about
what is going on now, then we do plausibly fOID1 a belief involving in some
way the relevant time. Wierenga's analysis would most plausibly account
for beliefs having similar fOID1 to a belief like "Now is when the meeting
starts." In such a case we do seem to be ascribing a property to a tensed
time. But not all beliefs de praesenti involve temporal indexicals, and the
range of those doing so which also ascribe properties to the present is narrow, indeed. Wierenga might attempt to adjust his analysis, such that in
having a belief de praesenti I grasp (even if I do not believe) a proposition
such as he describesY But if through my tensed beliefs I grasp information
which essentially involves a certain time and its properties, why is there no
necessary reference to that time in my conscious belief in the form of temporal indexicals like "now"? Just as first-person propositions must be
expressed in English via first-person indexicals, so present-time propositions, as Wierenga conceives them, must seemingly be expressed via present-tense indexicals. The absence of temporal indexicals from most of our
tensed beliefs renders implausible the idea that by means of them we grasp
propositions which involve essentially the ascription of properties to a time.
Moreover, Wierenga's analysis of tensed beliefs is drastically incomplete,
since it overlooks all but present-tense beliefs. How are beliefs like "John
left at 8:00" or "John will come home at 3:00" to be analyzed? It seems that
Wierenga's analysis would require him to say that such beliefs express a
proposition involving the haecceity of the time at which the belief is held
and which attributes to that time properties specifying certain B-relations to
events, for example, the time in question is such that John's leaving at 8:00 is
earlier than then and his coming home at 3:00 is later than them. This
II
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analysis serves to bring out that the property attributed to the time must be
tenseless, not only in past- and fuhlre-tense beliefs, but also in beliefs de
praesenti, lest the propositional content of God's beliefs be constitutive of a
past, present, and future for God. If God is to know tensed facts, then, such
knowledge comes, not through the property being such that p which is attributed to the time, but through the haecceity which the relevant time has.
Does the haecceity of any time t, then, include its tense? If not, then the
propositional content of God's beliefs is wholly tenseless, and all He grasps
are the tenseless B-relations between times and events. Indeed, it might be
argued that a time's haecceity cannot include its tense, since specific tense
determinations are accidental to times. A haecceity is an individual
essence; but since times are not essentially present, but acquire and lose
presentness, their particular tense determinations cannot be part of their
respective haecceities. Thus, the haecceity of a time must be a wholly
tenseless property. Since the attribution to a tenseless time of a property
involving tenseless B-relations of earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than
does not serve to introduce tense, it turns out that what God knows are
wholly tenseless propositions, not present-time propositions.
Wierenga could escape this conclusion by advocating an ontology of
presentism, according to which past and fuhlre times do not exist. Since
the only time that exists is the present time, presentness could be conceived
to be essential to any time. Just as existence is essential to any thing, since a
thing has existence in every possible world in which it exists, \3 so presentness is essential to any time, since a time has presentness at every time at
which it exists. Since a time cannot exist without being present, presentness therefore belongs to its haecceity.
The analogy with first-person propositions dearly suggests that for
Wierenga a time's haecceity involves its tense, indeed, its presentness. Just
as first-person propositions are exactly those which entail one's haecceity,
so present-time propositions are just those containing a time's haecceity.
But then it becomes extraordinarily difficult to understand how God can
grasp the haecceity of a time without that time's being present for Him,
which entails God's temporality. Consider the analogy of first-person
indexicals. If the individual essence which is my haecceity is not the property of being William Craig, but, as Wierenga maintains, the special property
of being me, then how can God possibly grasp a proposition which includes
this haecceity?14 Such a proposition is a private proposition which God cannot grasp because He is not I. If He can grasp such a proposition, then I fail
to see why someone who addresses me as "you" does not also grasp such a
proposition-in which case we are not talking about first-person propositions at all. Analogously, if a haecceity involves more than a tenseless Bdetermination, if it involves being present, then a timeless God cannot grasp
a proposition containing such a haecceity. To grasp a proposition attributing a B-relation to some time which is objectively present entails one's being
present. For example, in order to know the tensed fact expressed by Prior's
utterance, liThe 1960 exams are over," God must know more than the tenseless fact that the close of the exams is earlier than August 29, 1960; he must
know of August 29, 1960 that it is present, or past in relation to the present.
God's having such knowledge entails His temporality.
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Wierenga's analysis fails to explain how God can grasp propositions
involving haecceities which include the property of presentness without
His being temporal. It therefore also fails as a defense of a timeless God's
knowledge of tensed facts.
Finally, consider Brian Leftow's defense of God's timeless knowledge of
tensed facts. The key to Leftow's solution is his distinction, inspired by the
Special Theory of Relativity, between events' occurrence relative to various
temporal reference frames and their occurrence relative to God's "reference
frame" of eternity. Relative to eternity, all events are eternally present,
even though relative to various temporal reference frames they may be
past, present, or future respectively. Thus, relative to eternity there simply
are no temporally tensed facts to be known. Leftowexplains,
... all events are actual at once, in eternity. But it does not follow that
time is not tensed. Events also occur in temporal reference frames, and
the time of these reference frames may be tensed .... The reason a
timeless God does not know the essentially tensed fact that (T) is that
in His framework of reference, eternity, this is not afact at all. (T), again,
is the claim that a proper subset S of the set of temporal events, consisting of a, b, c, etc., now has present-actuality. In eternity this claim is
false. In eternity all temporal events ... have present-actuality at once. IS
By (T) Leftow apparently means that the members of 5, rather than 5 itself,
now have present-actuality. But how is this claim false in eternity? Since
all events have present-actuality in eternity, would not also the members of
S? Perhaps the problem is that all events have present-actuality at once in
eternity, whereas (T) states that the members of 5 have present-actuality
now. But in eternity, the indexical"now" in (T) refers either to the eternal
present or to the time of a, b, c. If it refers to the eternal present, then the
members of 5 do have present-actuality along with all other events. If it
refers to the lime of a, b, c, then it remains in Leftow's view a fact in eternity that a, b, c have present-actuality then. So the problem does not reside
in the contrast between now / at once. Perhaps the problem is that the present-actuality which a, b, c now have is temporal present-actuality, whereas in eternity they have eternal present-actuality. While this might seem to
make sense, it sits ill with Leftow's insistence that
The same events that A-occur in our temporal present A-occur in
God's eternal present. They are there 'in their presentness': the very
A-occurrence that is B-simultaneous with certain events within temporal reference frames is A-simultaneous with a timeless being's existence and with all temporal events within an eternal reference frame.
Thus God can timelessly perceive, all at once, the very A-occurring
that we perceive sequentially, under the form of change. 16
Since, on Leftow's definitions, to A-occur is to occur now,17 we face the
same indexical difficulty as above. If an event A-occurs in eternity, the
"now" refers either to the eternal present or to the temporal present. If it
refers to the eternal present, then it is not lithe very A-occurring that we
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perceive," since that occurring refers to the temporal now. But if we say
that it refers to the temporal present, then since the very same A-occurring
takes place in time and eternity, (T) is a fact in eternity after all. In order to
bring consistency into his account, it seems to me that Leftow ought to say
that for an event to A-occur is for that event to be present and that while
the same events exist in time and eternity, they are not present in the same
way with respect to these two "frames": events are temporally present
only in time and eternally present only in eternity. Therefore, in eternity
there are no temporally tensed facts; there are only eternally tensed facts,
and these are all in the eternal present-tense. Accordingly, (T), referring as
it does to the temporal present, is false in eternity, but it is also false that
the very same A-occurring that transpires in time takes place in eternity.
It might be thought that by (T) Leftow actually means
T'. Only the members of a proper subset S of all temporal events
have present actuality,
a claim which is true in time, but false in eternity, since in eternity all
events have present actuality. But if by "present actuality" we mean, not
merely tenseless metaphysical presence (which affords no knowledge of
tensed facts), but present-tense actuality, then it is clear that in atemporal
eternity events are not actual in that mode, for then eternity would be temporaU8 Such an interpretation would also be inconsistent with Leftow's
claim that in eternity God is presented with B-series of events relative to
inertial frames. 19 In any case, such present-tense actuality would leave God
completely in the dark as to past- and future-tensed facts; indeed, in having all events present to Him, God would either mistakenly believe that all
events are present or else be ignorant of which subclass of events really is
present and so have no knowledge of tensed facts.
Leftow's account thus seems to deny, not grant, God knowledge of
(temporally) tensed facts. All He knows are the eternal present-tense facts.
But Leftow maintains that God also knows the essentially tensed facts relative to temporal frames of reference. He writes,
A factually omniscient being can only be required to grasp directly
such facts as are genuinely facts within that being's framework of reference. Thus the fact that a timeless being grasps directly only the
essentially tensed facts of eternity does not count against His strict
factual omniscience, provided that He has some other access to the
essentially tensed facts of other reference frames. But ... a timeless
God can know all the facts of simultaneity that obtain in other reference frames. Thus He can know what the essentially tensed facts of
these other frames are, though He cannot be directly presented with
these facts: it is just not true that the only way God can know facts is
by some sort of direct presentation.20
Leftow's appeal to the distinction between direct and indirect grasping will
not serve to provide God with a knowledge of tensed facts, however. At best
God can know what are the simultaneity classes of events relative to any arbi-
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trarily specified reference frame or hypothetical observer, but He cannot know
what point on the world line of that observer or which simultaneity class of
events is present in that frame. 2l When we realize that the "eternal present" is
just a metaphorical description of a tenseless state of existence, then it is evident that on Leftow's account God knows no tensed facts. At the very least
He knows no temporally tensed facts, which is what was to be proved.
Indeed, Leftow's account of what he calls "factual omniscience" implies
that there really are no tensed facts. 22 According to Leftow a fact is either the
existing of a subject or a subject's exemplifying of an attribute. The same fact
can render a number of distinct propositions true. In Leftow's view the same
fact that renders It is then (i.e., at 3 P.M.) 3 P.M. true also renders true what is
expressed by the sentence token "It is now 3 P.M." These are distinct truths,
different propositions, rendered true by the same fact. That fact is accessible
at all times in varying ways and the various modes of access one can have to
this fact generate distinctive truths that can only be known at various times.
So even if God cannot be propositionally omniscient concerning events in
time, He can still be factually omniscient in regard to them.
The above account makes it evident that Leftow is really a B-theorist in
spite of himself, holding that there are no tensed facts. On his account a
tensed fact would be a subject's exemplifying a tensed property like presentness or the subject's presently existing. But such a fact is not accessible
at all times, but only at the time it obtains or exists. The proposition that It
is then 3 P.M. does not serve to access such a present-tensed fact, for we do
not know by it whether 3 P.M. is past, present, or future. The fact that renders such a proposition true must therefore be tenseless, even if that tenseless fact generates a tensed proposition at 3 P.M. Since there are no facts
that escape God's omniscience and the only temporal facts God knows are
tenseless facts, it follows that tensed facts do not exist.
Moreover, Leftow's account of God's factual omniscience seems untenable. For Leftow does not think that the propositional context expressed
by tensed sentences is tenseless and that tense results from the mode of
presentation to or access by language users. Rather he holds that there are
tensed propositions which can be known only at certain times. But unless
Leftow is prepared to reject a view of truth as correspondence, there must
be facts corresponding to true tensed propositions, for example, that 3 P.M.
is present. If this proposition is true, then it states a fact about the world.
Even if we agree with Leftow that there are facts which are stated by no
proposition, he has not given us any reason to doubt that every true proposition states a fact. Indeed, a view of truth as correspondence seems to
require it. It follows, therefore, that a timeless God is not only not propositionally omniscient, but not even factually omniscient.

Omniscience Despite Ignorance of Tensed Facts
It seems evident, then, that if God knows tensed facts, He is temporal, so that
a denial of (5) is untenable. What prospect is there then for escaping the present objection by a denial of (4)? Here it is not enough simply to assert that a
timelessly existing being cannot be expected to know tensed facts, on the
basis that this is to demand the logically impossible. 23 Of course, such a feat
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is logically impossible; that is the point of the necessary truth of (5). But so
long as we retain the customary definition of omniscience
0: 5 is omniscient = df For all p, if p, then 5 knows that p and
does not believe that -p
and agree that tense is part of the propositional content expressed by
tensed sentences, then it follows that God, in order to be omniscient, must
know tensed facts. If such knowledge is precluded by His timelessness,
then He is not omniscient.
The above suggests that the most promising strategy for the atemporalist will be either to revise the traditional definition of omniscience or to
deny that tense, though objective, belongs to the propositional content of
tensed sentences.
Generally speaking, the difficulty encountered in the first approach is
that any adequate definition must be in accord with our intuitive understanding of the difiniendum, so that we are not at liberty to "cook" the definition of omniscience in order to resolve the difficulty without the definition's becoming unacceptably ad hOC. 24 So what plausible alternative to 0
does the atemporalist suggest?
Wierenga, in a sort of second line of defense, is prepared to accept that
some propositions are "perspectival," true at some perspectives and false
at others. With respect to tense what this amounts to is the admission that
propositions have their truth values relative to times and thus sometimes
change their truth values. 0 would require God to know all such true
propositions and, hence, to be temporal and changing. But Wierenga,
observing that believing that a proposition is true at a perspective is different from believing at a perspective that a proposition is true, proposes the
following re-definition of omniscience: 25
0': X is omniscient = df For any proposition p and perspective
<s,b, (i) if P is true at <s,b, then X
knows that p is true at <s,t>, and
(ii) if X is at <s,t> and p is true at <s,t>,
then at <s,t>, X knows p.
According to 0' God must know which tensed propositions are true at
which times, but He need not know the tensed propositions themselves.
Wierenga concludes, "if some propositions really do change their truth
value over time, if propositions are thus 'perspectival,' then ... an omniscient being is required to know a perspectival proposition only if the
being is at a perspective at which the proposition is true"; thus, "it follows
from the claim that God is omniscient that he is not eternal only on the
assumption that he is at some temporal perspective .... "26
Wierenga's definition 0' is, however, unacceptably contrived. For the
ostensibly perspectival nature of truth is not a sufficient condition for
exempting knowledge of a certain class of propositions from the concept of
omniscience. In Wierenga's view, God has knowledge of propositions stating exclusively tenseless B-facts, such as that p is true at t, whereas temporal
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persons know a multitude of objectively true propositions which remain
unknown to God. Persons located at t know not merely that p is true at t;
they know p simpliciter, an objectively true proposition of which God is
ignorant. Wierenga re-defines omniscience in such a way that a being
which does not know tensed propositions can nonetheless be declared to
be omniscient. But in the absence of independent grounds for accepting
0', such a procedure is unacceptably ad hoc. If we wish to include temporal perspectives in our definition of omniscience, then why not adopt
Davis's following definition?27

0": S is omniscient = df For all p, if pat t, then it is true at t that
S knows that p and does not believe -po
On 0", unlike 0', God would know every true proposition instead of just
some; this intuitively commends 0' as a more adequate definition of
omniscience. 28 But 0" would require that God know tensed propositions, as (4) states.
Leftow also entertains the idea that omniscience be re-defined in such a
way that God not be required to know all truths, including tensed truthS. 29 He
argues, in effect, that there are plausibly many sorts of truths that God cannot
know, so what harm is there in admitting one more class of truths of which
God is ignorant? But Leftow's strategy is misconceived. This reasoning does
not constitute grounds for revising the concept of omniscience as such (which
does not even involve reference to God), but rather for denying that God need
be omniscient. That is a moot question to which we shall return.
A more plausible and independently motivated re-definition of omniscience would be to deny that God's knowledge is propositional in nature
and therefore not adequately described by 0, which gives a propositional
account of omniscience. 30 God's knowledge may be construed as a simple
intuition of reality which we finite knowers represent to ourselves in terms
of discrete propositions. If facts are propositional in nature (a fact being a
true proposition," for example), then God could be said not to know facts
as such, tensed or otherwise, though He is omniscient.
But I think that such a re-construal, while plausible and attractive, does
not serve to avert the force of the present objection. The critic of divine
timelessness will simply re-formulate (4) in such a way that the problem
re-appears, for example:

4'. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows
what we cognize as tensed facts.
If God were ignorant of what we represent to ourselves propositionally as
tensed facts, He would not deserve to be called omniscient.
No good reason has been given, then, for revising the definition of
omniscience in such a way that omniscience does not encompass knowledge of (what we cognize as) tensed propositions.
Suppose, then, that the atemporalist tries the other route to a denial of
(4), maintaining that tense does not belong to the propositional content
expressed by tensed sentences. Like personal and spatial indexicals, tempo-
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ral indexicals and tensed expressions could reflect features of the mode of
presentation or the context of believing or the way of grasping the propositional content expressed by sentences containing such locutions. Or they
could be analyzed in terms of our self-ascription of properties rather than,
or in addition to, our believing propositions. Such analyses need not deny
the objective reality of tense, but could simply exclude tense from the
propositional content of tensed expressions, having it lodge somewhere
else. Given the customary definition 0, a timeless God would count as
omniscient, even given the necessary truth of (5), because there are no
tensed facts, where facts and true propositions are extensionally equivalent.
Again, it seems to me that such analyses are both attractive and plausible,
but I doubt that they ultimately serve to avert the problem raised by the present objection. If tense is an objective feature of reality, then one might plausibly contend that there are non-propositional facts (for example, first-person
facts) and that tensed facts are also among these. Since, according to
Christian theism, God is not merely propositionally omniscient, but maximally excellent cognitively, He must know such tensed facts, just as He must
possess non-propositional knowledge de se. His cognitive excellence would
not require Him to possess everyone's knowledge de se, since it would be a
cognitive defect for God to believe that He is Napoleon (not to mention His
believing Himself also to be Washington and Reagan and ... ). Similarly, it
would be a cognitive defect for God to believe that it is now 44 B.C. (not to
mention His believing it also to be 1895 and 2020 and ...). But it is a cognitive perfection to have a knowledge of what time it really is, of what episode
in the history of the actual world is present. A being who is ignorant of all
tensed facts is less excellent cognitively than one who knows all such facts. 3'
The latter being knows infinitely more than the former and suffers no cognitive defect in so doing. On the contrary, it is only by the grace of such knowledge that God can act providentially in the temporal world at all. 33 Hence,
(4) can be reformulated as
4*. If a temporal world exists, then if God is maximally excellent cognitively, God knows tensed facts.
With a similarly recast (2) the argument goes through as before. In case one
still sticks at non-propositional facts, one may substitute in (4*) for "tensed
facts" an expression like "what time it is" and revise (5) accordingly.
In short, the prospects for turning back the force of (4) seem no better
than those for denying (5). Given the existence of the temporal world, an
omniscient or cognitively perfect being must know tensed facts. Since
omniscience is essential to theism and such knowledge is incompatible
with divine timelessness, God must not be timeless.

Must God Be Omniscient?
Our discussion has assumed the truth of
2. God is omniscient,
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but some defenders of divine timelessness, determined to preserve God's
atemporality, are prepared to deny (2). Kvanvig, in response to the objection that "Just as we cannot hold the view that God is never intimately
enough acquainted with himself to know himself as himself, so it would be
a mark of imperfection were God never to be intimately acquainted with
any temporal ... location," observes that there are two options open. 34
First, one could reject divine timelessness. In order to exhibit maximal perfection, God must directly grasp whatever moment is present and so be
constantly changing. According to Kvanvig, the traditional motivations
for the doctrine of timelessness are not compelling, so that it can be sacrificed if found incompatible with omniscience or cognitive perfection.35
Such a verdict goes down hard with Leftow, who advocates rejecting (2)
rather than (1) if these are incompatible.36 He argues that God is ignorant of
several classes of truth and that it is not a serious attenuation of divine
omniscience to hold that He is also ignorant of tensed truths. It might be
thought that we should construe God's knowledge as robustly as possible,
so that even if there tum out to be some truths He cannot know, so that He
is not omniscient, nevertheless that constitutes no justification for further
eroding the extent of His knowledge by holding Him to be ignorant of
tensed truths. But Leftow is so deeply committed to the doctrine of divine
timelessness that he is prepared to jettison God's omniscience in order to
preserve His timelessness. But does Leftow succeed in showing that God
cannot know all true propositions? His example of something God cannot
know is how it feels to be, oneself, a walker, a breather, or a sinner.37 But
such knowledge is not propositional knowledge at all and so fails to furnish
examples of truths which God does not know; hence, on 0 God is omniscient even though He does not know how it feels to be oneself a sinner.
Leftow recognizes the non-propositional character of such knowledge, but
insists that God's lacking such knowledge entails His ignorance of certain
truths as well. If I arrange for a person to fail a test, I can say to him afterwards, "Being a failure oneself feels like this." According to Leftow,
This is a proposition we both grasp .... You and I can know that
being a failure oneself feels like this, but if God cannot fail, God cannot (though He can know how failure feels to you). For if God cannot
fail, God cannot have the kind of experience "this" picks out and so
in a sense cannot even understand the proposition that 'being a failure oneself feels like this.'3"
It seems to me that the defender of God's omniscience will very plausibly reply that "Being a failure oneself feels like this" is a sentence, not a
proposition, as is evident from the presence of the demonstrative "this"
(the italicizing of which does nothing to change its semantic content).
Demonstratives serve to focus the hearer's attention on the referent and,
like indexicals, are typically not construed to be part of the propositional
content of the utterance involving them. The propositional content
expressed by "this" in the example will be the feelings of humiliation,
depression, and so forth that attend being oneself a failure. Leftow seems
to think that because God cannot have such feelings, He cannot know the
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propositional content expressed by the utterance. But this is to confuse
God's ability to have the non-propositional knowledge of how it feels to be
a failure oneself with His ability to know that being a failure oneself feels
like being humiliated, and so forth. Even in LeHow's own example, the
referent of "this" is not the speaker's own feelings, since he did not fail, but
rather the other person's feelings who did fail. Yet Leftow asserts that they
both know the same proposition. Similarly God can know the same
propositional content that we do when we make such utterances, even
though He does not share our experiences and so does not know how it
feels to be oneself a failure.
It might well be questioned whether preserving God's atemporality is
worth the price of rendering Him ignorant of what state of the universe
presently exists, as well as of all other tensed truths. But LeHow surmises
that a God who is timeless but not omniscient with respect to tensed truths
would be more perfect over all than a God who is temporal and possesses
such knowledge. Leftow's many arguments for divine timelessness aim to
extol the perfection accruing to God due to this attribute. Unfortunately, a
discussion of these arguments takes us beyond the bounds of this paper.
But I believe that all but one of his arguments can be shown to be unsound
or inconclusive, as I have elsewhere tried to show. 39 The greatness of
divine temporality, on the other hand, can be seen in the fact that, if time is
tensed, God could not be creatively active in the world were He timeless. 40
Leftow also attempts to cheapen the value of omniscience, arguing that
it is not a necessary property of a perfect knower. He rightly points out
that cognitive perfection involves many other qualities than the range of
one's knowledge. But that does nothing to show that cognitive perfection
should not also encompass knowledge of tensed facts. Leftow proceeds to
attack the possibility of propositional omniscience, appealing to private
propositions expressed by sentences containing first-person indexicals.
But we have already seen how such knowledge de se can be handled nonpropositionally, not to mention the objections to private propositions.'! In
any case, positing one restriction on the range of God's knowledge hardly
makes it a matter of indifference whether further restrictions are proposed.
The fact that propositional omniscience and maximal cognitive excellence
have not been shown to be impossible undercuts Leftow's response to
what he calls the semantic argument against divine timelessness.
But what about Kvanvig's other alternative? He proposes that God be
conceived to grasp all temporal moments directly.42 Such an understanding, he claims, would be analogous to a plausible construal of omnipresence as the direct grasping of the essence of every spatial location. What
this analogy would imply, however, is that all times are literally present for
God, not in the metaphorical sense of the eternal present, but in the literal
temporal sense of the term. That is simply incompatible with there being a
temporal series of events ordered by relations of earlier than/later than. In
order to rebut this objection, Kvanvig is forced to resort either to the device
of ET-simultaneity of Stump and Kretzmann-which is explanatorily vacuous43--or to the suggestion that omniscient beings can grasp essences of
moments directly without being in time-which is both ad hoc and selfcontradictory.44
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In conclusion, therefore, I think that we have good reason to believe that
if a temporal world exists and an A-Theory of time is correct, then divine
timelessness is incompatible with divine omniscience and, moreover, that
if, as I claim, the arguments for God's atemporality are at best inconclusive,
it is divine timelessness which ought to yield pride of place to divine omniscience.
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